CEO KPI Examples and Performance Scorecards: 7 ASX Companies Compared

If you are setting a CEO's annual bonus, the hardest question is often not how much to pay. It is deciding which results the CEO should be accountable for, how much each result should count and what happens when financial performance is strong but customer, safety or risk outcomes are poor.

The CEO remuneration reports of Commonwealth Bank, Woolworths, CSL, REA Group, Wesfarmers, Transurban and BHP provide seven real approaches. Each uses a scorecard, but the measures reflect different business models. The comparison below translates published disclosures into a practical format that an Australian board or business owner can adapt without needing a remuneration specialist.

Scope and reporting dates: The examples primarily use FY2026 annual reports available as at October 2026. Commonwealth Bank's FY2025 CEO scorecard is used as a fully itemised, directly sourced example; CBA has since published its FY2026 annual report, so the FY2025 weights should not be represented as its current FY2026 scorecard. CSL's FY2026 former CEO scorecard is distinguished from its interim CEO arrangement and from the redesigned FY2027 scorecard. These are annual incentive scorecards, not the separate multi-year LTI performance tests.

Seven ASX CEO scorecards compared

Read the figures carefully: These are not seven directly comparable CEO bonus payouts. Some are group scorecard outcomes, some are CEO-specific results, and Wesfarmers uses an integrated equity incentive rather than a conventional annual cash STI. The scorecard weights, assessment curves and deferral arrangements also differ. Sources are linked to each company in the sections below.

1. Commonwealth Bank: make customer outcomes and leadership measurable

Commonwealth Bank's published FY2025 CEO scorecard for Matt Comyn is a useful example of a bank evaluating financial performance alongside customer outcomes, people and strategic execution.

The FY2025 CEO scorecard delivered 107.5% of target. Separate risk, reputation and values assessments resulted in no adjustment that year.

The transferable idea is to separate what was achieved from how it was achieved. A growing business can meet its profit budget yet still have serious customer complaints or control failures. A CEO scorecard should make those issues visible rather than allowing strong profits to conceal them.

The practical adaptation: a professional services business could measure operating profit, working capital, client retention, employee turnover and two agreed strategic projects, while treating serious compliance failures as a separate approval or adjustment condition.

Source: CBA FY2025 Annual Report, CEO short-term variable remuneration scorecard, page 196. For the newest reporting period, see CBA FY2026 Annual Report.

2. Woolworths: make customer experience and safety count as much as two financial measures

Woolworths' FY2026 Group STI scorecard used five equally weighted measures, with each worth 20%:

The group scorecard outcome was 115.9% of target, or 77.2% of maximum, and individual awards could also reflect personal contribution and conduct.

This is useful for retailers and operational employers because sales growth is not necessarily good growth. Heavy discounting can increase sales while weakening margins, too much inventory can consume cash and poor safety outcomes create real human and financial costs.

Woolworths announced a FY2027 change to its efficiency measure: working capital days would be replaced by cost of doing business as a percentage of sales. The company retained 60% financial weighting and 40% customer and safety weighting. This illustrates a sensible annual review: keep the scorecard stable enough to compare performance, but change a metric when another better reflects management's actual decisions.

Source: Woolworths Group FY2026 Annual Report and remuneration report.

3. CSL: the scorecard needs to work when results disappoint

CSL's FY2026 executive incentive framework included financial growth, cash conversion, sustainability and individual goals. For former CEO Paul McKenzie, the disclosed FY2026 weights were:

Despite the framework allowing rewards for different results, McKenzie received no FY2026 STI. CSL also reported no STI for certain other executive KMP and no vesting for the relevant LTI award. Importantly, interim CEO Gordon Naylor was not eligible for the STI or LTI programs, so it would be incorrect to portray this as his personal FY2026 bonus scorecard.

CSL subsequently redesigned its FY2027 STI scorecard:

Under the redesigned framework, individual performance and behaviours act as a modifier of between minus 50% and plus 20%, rather than occupying a separate weighted slice of the scorecard.

A smaller company can learn two things from this. First, the bonus must genuinely be able to fall to zero if key results are not met. Second, individual achievement should not necessarily cancel out weak company-wide performance. Consider an explicit company affordability or performance gateway before approving personal bonus awards.

Source: CSL FY2026 Annual Report, remuneration framework, page 70 and FY2027 changes, page 61.

4. REA Group: combine profitable growth with a small number of personal priorities

REA Group's FY2026 CEO short-term incentive scorecard is particularly easy to understand:

For FY2026, REA disclosed Group revenue achievement of 101.0% of target and EBITDA achievement of 105.1% of target. The incentive payout curves translated these into 106.3% and 131.3% of target payout respectively. That distinction is important: achieving 105% of an operating target does not necessarily mean receiving 105% of the bonus allocated to that measure.

CEO Cameron McIntyre's FY2026 STI was pro-rated from his appointment on 3 November 2025 and equalled 113.1% of his pro-rated target.

For a smaller company, REA's framework offers a practical starting point. Revenue measures growth, EBITDA measures whether growth is profitable, and personal objectives can cover two or three material priorities such as launching a new service, improving technology or building leadership capability.

The caution is that individual measures should have clear evidence and decision criteria, rather than a vaguely worded requirement to 'demonstrate leadership'.

Source: REA Group 2026 company reports, FY2026 executive remuneration section.

5. Wesfarmers: use different scorecards for group and divisional leaders

Wesfarmers' FY2026 KEEPP framework divided its annual performance assessment into financial, safety, business-enhancing and sustainability measures:

The interesting feature is that the actual targets vary by executive. Rob Scott's responsibilities as Group Managing Director differ from those of the leaders of Bunnings and Kmart, even though the broad weighting architecture is shared.

This matters in diversified companies. The CEO may be measured on capital allocation, overall returns and group strategy, while the head of a division should also be assessed against the outcomes within their own business.

Wesfarmers does not simply pay a normal annual cash STI for its CEO and CFO. Its KEEPP delivers variable remuneration through equity, with extended performance and restriction periods. The annual scorecard determines awards within a much longer remuneration framework.

A medium-sized business can borrow the scorecard logic without using the seven-year equity arrangement. Keep a common 60/10/20/10 structure but choose role-relevant financial and project objectives.

Source: Wesfarmers FY2026 Annual Report, KEEPP scorecards.

6. Transurban: include cost discipline and actual delivery, not just profit

Transurban's FY2026 Group STI scorecard used the following measures:

The Group STI outcome was 96% of target, or 64% of maximum. Underlying results were not uniform: proportional EBITDA achieved an 83% outcome, while net costs achieved 117%. Customer and delivery results reached 110%, with HSSE at 90%.

This structure suits an infrastructure business because managing costs, delivering major projects and keeping people safe matter alongside headline financial performance. Transurban's report also discusses board discretion in the safety assessment following a fatal incident involving a contractor on the West Gate Tunnel project.

For a smaller business, replace the infrastructure-specific measures with operating profit, controllable expenses, on-time project delivery and safety or service quality. A construction or logistics CEO should not receive the maximum bonus simply because profit is strong while significant delivery or safety issues remain unresolved.

Source: Transurban FY2026 Corporate Report, page 98.

7. BHP: give safety and sustainability a substantial weighting

BHP's FY2026 Cash and Deferred Plan (CDP) scorecard for CEO Mike Henry was:

The 118% result equalled approximately 79% of maximum. The outcome was assessed by the board, including consideration of material matters disclosed in the remuneration report.

The key lesson for resource-intensive operations is that safety should not be treated as an optional footnote. With a quarter of the scorecard allocated to safety and sustainability, those matters affect annual remuneration in a visible way.

BHP also delivers CDP awards in a combination of cash and deferred equity. The scorecard outcome therefore does not describe a full cash bonus paid immediately.

Source: BHP FY2026 Annual Report, Remuneration Report and FY2026 statutory filing.

What do the seven scorecards tell us?

There is no standard CEO performance scorecard that works for every Australian business. What these reports demonstrate is a common discipline: the weights should reflect the organisation's strategy and the risks that could undermine it.

A business trying to grow profitably may emphasise revenue and EBITDA. A retailer may give significant weight to customers, stock and safety. A bank needs capital-adjusted performance and strong risk assessment. An infrastructure business needs financial returns and project delivery. A diversified group needs an approach that works at both enterprise and divisional levels.

Avoid copying percentages simply because a large ASX company uses them. The purpose of these examples is to understand why measures were chosen and what decisions they are designed to influence.

A ready-to-use CEO scorecard for a smaller Australian company

Imagine an Australian business with 80 employees, $18 million in revenue, multiple clients and a CEO responsible for growth, operational performance and people leadership.

A workable annual scorecard could be:

These are illustrative targets, not actual benchmarking data or recommended standards for every employer. The company would adjust the measures and target levels to its own financial plan, workforce and risk profile.

For a business with material safety exposure, replace some of the customer or strategic weighting with a measurable safety component and a clear treatment of serious incidents.

How to calculate the CEO's bonus

Suppose the CEO's fixed annual remuneration is $250,000 and the board approves a 30% target bonus, equivalent to $75,000. The maximum is set at 150% of the target bonus, or $112,500.

The year-end assessment might be:

The illustrative bonus would be:

$75,000 × 102.5% = $76,875.

This is a simplified company-designed calculation, not the payout formula of any of the seven ASX companies. It assumes the listed payout achievement percentages were derived from predetermined threshold, target and maximum curves.

If the company missed a financial gateway, had a material compliance failure or the board applied a documented risk adjustment, the final payable award could be lower or zero depending on the approved plan rules.

How should threshold, target and maximum work?

Weightings alone do not make a scorecard usable. Each measure also needs an agreed performance scale.

The board could use straight-line interpolation between these points. If actual EBITDA were $2.85 million, halfway between target and maximum, the payout for the EBITDA component would be 125% of target.

Do not automatically use the same higher-is-better curve for every measure. Safety incidents, costs and debtor days often need an inverse scale where lower results are better. Some measures need a binary gateway, particularly serious misconduct or regulatory breaches.

It is also important to define whether EBIT or EBITDA includes one-off transactions, acquisitions, restructuring costs and other adjustments before the year begins, so the board does not redesign the bonus after seeing the result.

Who should set and approve the CEO scorecard?

In a company with a board, the chair and remuneration committee should lead the design and approval of the CEO's goals. Finance should confirm that financial targets reconcile to the approved budget, while HR or the company secretary can maintain the written plan and supporting evidence.

In a founder-led business without a formal remuneration committee, the owners or directors can use the same principles. Agree the targets at the start of the year, review progress quarterly and retain one clear approval record for the final outcome.

The CEO may provide input about operational feasibility, but should not be the sole decision-maker on their own target levels or annual award.

Mistakes that make CEO scorecards difficult to defend

Too many metrics. A 15-line scorecard can look sophisticated but often makes it difficult for the CEO to identify the priorities. Five to seven measures are usually easier for a small employer to administer.

Vague strategic objectives. 'Improve culture' or 'drive transformation' can mean different things to different directors. Specify observable deliverables, evidence and the date by which they should be completed.

Confusing operational achievement with incentive payout. A 105% EBITDA outcome may generate a 125% bonus factor under the plan's payout curve. Report both figures so nobody thinks they are interchangeable.

Ignoring adverse risk outcomes. A CEO should not receive a maximum payout automatically when profit targets are met but serious safety or compliance concerns remain. Document how material incidents affect the assessment.

Treating equity vesting as annual bonus performance. An STI scorecard evaluates one reporting year, while LTI performance rights can depend on several years of results. Explain these separately in the remuneration report.

Changing scorecards retrospectively. Review metrics annually and document changes before the relevant performance period. Do not use the final payout as a reason to rewrite the original target.

CEO scorecard approval checklist

• Every measure links to an agreed business objective.
• Weightings total 100%.
• The CEO can materially influence the outcomes.
• Targets are challenging but achievable and supported by the budget.
• Each measure has an evidence owner and clear calculation definition.
• Threshold, target and maximum payout curves are approved in advance.
• Material risk, conduct or safety failures are addressed in plan rules.
• The board documents discretion and any adjusted results.
• Annual STI and multi-year LTI are assessed separately.
• The final outcome is explained in plain language.

The practical takeaway

The most useful lesson from these seven ASX companies is not that a CEO scorecard needs to be complicated. It is that remuneration should reward the results that genuinely create sustainable value, while making it difficult for poor customer, people, safety or risk outcomes to be ignored.

For most Australian employers, a well-designed scorecard with five to seven measures, clear weightings, evidence and a documented approval process will be more useful than copying the entire executive remuneration framework of a large listed company.

Want to design or review a CEO performance scorecard? Contact Remunera for executive remuneration benchmarking, incentive design and board-ready remuneration reporting.

Research note: This article draws on annual disclosures available at 29 October 2026. The Commonwealth Bank weights shown are specifically FY2025, while the other company examples are FY2026, with CSL's FY2027 changes separately identified. Company outcomes are not directly comparable and should not be interpreted as equivalent CEO cash bonus payments.